Monday, May 19, 2008
Final Thoughts on BRIC and Burma
A bout of insomnia has me surfing the 'net to follow some of the threads of stories I have been writing about.
In Washington, the narrative is that the autocracies of Russia and China played the lead in blocking efforts in the UN Security Council to pressure the junta in Burma/Myanmar to accept aid, but New Europehas a different headline: "China, Indonesia helped Burma block aid." Doesn't fit the matrix, though--since both are Asian powers but one is an aspiring member of a U.S.-led League of Democracies.
Viewing international coverage of the BRIC summit, I found some interesting, and telling, patterns. First, let me make clear that I am not one to over-emphasize this meeting. Pravda.ru is free to spout off that the Yekaterinburg meeting created some sort of anti-Western alliance, but that is rubbish. The meeting had much more modest goals--but they succeeded in reaching them. For one, the idea that these four states should meet on a regular basis to discuss world affairs and exchange their viewpoints. Moreover, that they don't need to work via the "hub" of the United States.
So, what does a quick perusal of the net show? Plenty of English-language coverage from Russian, Indian and Chinese news sources. The international wires covered the story--but as far as I can tell, their reports were picked up primarily by the UK media. Little or no coverage or discussion in the U.S.
Which brings me to a final thought about any LOD. All of the U.S. proponents argue that the U.S. is the country that has to bring the LOD about. But is that necessarily the case? Other democracies are free to lay the foundation for the LOD. If they aren't, what does that mean? The EU has created a LOD that is territorially restricted to Europe and has very high standards for admittance. India has, in recent years, created two interesting multilateral formats--the Russia-India-China one (RIC) and the India-Brazil-South Africa one (IBSA), which held a meeting prior to the RIC/BRIC one in South Africa (and will hold a summit in New Delhi later this year). Other countries are engaged in creative exercises in multilateralism--and are taking, yes, short baby steps, but steps nonetheless, toward greater institutionalization. It is a touch of arrogance to assume that we must be present "at the creation" for any such body to have any sort of impact.
It's also clear that few of my colleagues in DC paid attention to what the Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim said in Cape Town about democracy at the IBSA ministerial:
The IBSA alliance, said Mr Amorim, is "in favour of our peoples, of humanity, a world where democracy will prevail - not just a political democracy but a social, cultural democracy".
Does this mean that he would be sympathetic to the PRC's claim that lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and creating conditions for a middle-class existence is just as democratic as having competitive elections? I don't know--but it clearly returns a question I think many of us here in Washington thought was settled after 1989--that democracy means political democracy.
And for those who care--the IBSA forum also got no coverage in the U.S. press, not even much in the specialized foreign affairs media.
In Washington, the narrative is that the autocracies of Russia and China played the lead in blocking efforts in the UN Security Council to pressure the junta in Burma/Myanmar to accept aid, but New Europehas a different headline: "China, Indonesia helped Burma block aid." Doesn't fit the matrix, though--since both are Asian powers but one is an aspiring member of a U.S.-led League of Democracies.
Viewing international coverage of the BRIC summit, I found some interesting, and telling, patterns. First, let me make clear that I am not one to over-emphasize this meeting. Pravda.ru is free to spout off that the Yekaterinburg meeting created some sort of anti-Western alliance, but that is rubbish. The meeting had much more modest goals--but they succeeded in reaching them. For one, the idea that these four states should meet on a regular basis to discuss world affairs and exchange their viewpoints. Moreover, that they don't need to work via the "hub" of the United States.
So, what does a quick perusal of the net show? Plenty of English-language coverage from Russian, Indian and Chinese news sources. The international wires covered the story--but as far as I can tell, their reports were picked up primarily by the UK media. Little or no coverage or discussion in the U.S.
Which brings me to a final thought about any LOD. All of the U.S. proponents argue that the U.S. is the country that has to bring the LOD about. But is that necessarily the case? Other democracies are free to lay the foundation for the LOD. If they aren't, what does that mean? The EU has created a LOD that is territorially restricted to Europe and has very high standards for admittance. India has, in recent years, created two interesting multilateral formats--the Russia-India-China one (RIC) and the India-Brazil-South Africa one (IBSA), which held a meeting prior to the RIC/BRIC one in South Africa (and will hold a summit in New Delhi later this year). Other countries are engaged in creative exercises in multilateralism--and are taking, yes, short baby steps, but steps nonetheless, toward greater institutionalization. It is a touch of arrogance to assume that we must be present "at the creation" for any such body to have any sort of impact.
It's also clear that few of my colleagues in DC paid attention to what the Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim said in Cape Town about democracy at the IBSA ministerial:
The IBSA alliance, said Mr Amorim, is "in favour of our peoples, of humanity, a world where democracy will prevail - not just a political democracy but a social, cultural democracy".
Does this mean that he would be sympathetic to the PRC's claim that lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and creating conditions for a middle-class existence is just as democratic as having competitive elections? I don't know--but it clearly returns a question I think many of us here in Washington thought was settled after 1989--that democracy means political democracy.
And for those who care--the IBSA forum also got no coverage in the U.S. press, not even much in the specialized foreign affairs media.
A League of the Unwilling
Jackson Diehl, over the weekend, again picks up on the old tired theme of "the authoritarian states" (e.g. Russia and China) blocking "the democracies" from doing good in the world.
He writes:
"Take the past few months: China, helped by Russia, has stopped the Security Council from discussing a humanitarian intervention to rescue the 1.5 million Burmese endangered by the criminal neglect of their government following a cyclone. Strong sanctions against Iran for its refusal to freeze its nuclear program have been blocked by Russia. An attempted U.N. intervention in Darfur is failing, largely because of Chinese and Russian refusal to authorize stronger measures against the government of Sudan."
All true--but only half of the picture, as readers of TWR are aware. "Southern democracies" have joined with authoritarians to defend the principle of state sovereignty--and as we've seen in the case of Burma, the call for pan-Asian solidarity against "Western colonialism" seems to have carried more weight, with ASEAN states arguing they can deal with the junta in Rangoon to get aid delivered, and would the French foreign minister kindly refrain from his remarks.
In the case of Sudan, the West and Asian democracies like Japan and India decry the role of Beijing and Moscow but don't seem to want to push on their own, which they would be perfectly free to do. Even presidential candidates have had investments with funds that provide capital for businesses in Sudan.
What Diehl, Ikenberry, Daalder and others are under an obligation to demonstrate, and in my opinion have NOT DONE, is that 1) countries are prepared to come together in a League of Democracies and 2) they are prepared to take action even when the Security Council is divided. I don't find much evidence, beyond a few countries that were part of the Iraq coalition of the willing, which undercuts the whole notion of the League being a way for the U.S. to be much more multilateral and share burdens. I certainly don't find support for this idea among continental European states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), as well as other leading democracies like Brazil, Australia, or India.
It is not enough for American academics and policy advisors to declare from the heights of Olympus which states might be invited to join a league or concert of democracies--but to show that governments and populations of said countries actually want to join.
Senator McCain, to his credit, has backed away from describing a proposed league as a new international organization in favor of a body that would bring together the major democracies for consultations on joint action, which is a more realistic and feasible plan.
We have to see the world as it is--and this neat divide between democracies and autocracies just doesn't exist.
Funny, that Diehl doesn't mention the BRIC summit that took place as he was writing his op-ed piece. Doesn't fit into the picture, so best to ignore it.
He writes:
"Take the past few months: China, helped by Russia, has stopped the Security Council from discussing a humanitarian intervention to rescue the 1.5 million Burmese endangered by the criminal neglect of their government following a cyclone. Strong sanctions against Iran for its refusal to freeze its nuclear program have been blocked by Russia. An attempted U.N. intervention in Darfur is failing, largely because of Chinese and Russian refusal to authorize stronger measures against the government of Sudan."
All true--but only half of the picture, as readers of TWR are aware. "Southern democracies" have joined with authoritarians to defend the principle of state sovereignty--and as we've seen in the case of Burma, the call for pan-Asian solidarity against "Western colonialism" seems to have carried more weight, with ASEAN states arguing they can deal with the junta in Rangoon to get aid delivered, and would the French foreign minister kindly refrain from his remarks.
In the case of Sudan, the West and Asian democracies like Japan and India decry the role of Beijing and Moscow but don't seem to want to push on their own, which they would be perfectly free to do. Even presidential candidates have had investments with funds that provide capital for businesses in Sudan.
What Diehl, Ikenberry, Daalder and others are under an obligation to demonstrate, and in my opinion have NOT DONE, is that 1) countries are prepared to come together in a League of Democracies and 2) they are prepared to take action even when the Security Council is divided. I don't find much evidence, beyond a few countries that were part of the Iraq coalition of the willing, which undercuts the whole notion of the League being a way for the U.S. to be much more multilateral and share burdens. I certainly don't find support for this idea among continental European states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), as well as other leading democracies like Brazil, Australia, or India.
It is not enough for American academics and policy advisors to declare from the heights of Olympus which states might be invited to join a league or concert of democracies--but to show that governments and populations of said countries actually want to join.
Senator McCain, to his credit, has backed away from describing a proposed league as a new international organization in favor of a body that would bring together the major democracies for consultations on joint action, which is a more realistic and feasible plan.
We have to see the world as it is--and this neat divide between democracies and autocracies just doesn't exist.
Funny, that Diehl doesn't mention the BRIC summit that took place as he was writing his op-ed piece. Doesn't fit into the picture, so best to ignore it.
Friday, May 16, 2008
Whose Responsibility to Protect?
I'll be appearing on The Agenda with Steve Paikin tonight to discuss the Responsibility to Protect and the crisis in Burma/Myanmar. It is always difficult to talk about international relations in the abstract when tens of thousands of people are dead or dying. But we have to face up to the problem that we always want to help, but at little or no cost--and the Burma case, like Somalia before it, raises difficulties.
My fellow panelists didn't like that I've adopted the position articulated by Pang Zhongying, that there is no "international community" that exists above or separate from sovereign nation-states. To quote from his 2002 essay:
it is necessary to draw the distinction between the concepts of "international community" versus "international society." "Community" implies that its components share many things in common, such as values, whereas "society" recognizes that, while actors may have shared interests, there is no overarching common power or universal standard. Former United Nations Secretary-General Butros Butros Ghali has been a leading proponent of the notion of "the international community." I maintain that, at present, one can use the term "international community" to describe something like the European Union, a community of nation-states sharing common values, institutions, and procedures, but I do not believe that Ghali's vision applies to the reality of world politics. Thus, in assessing China's international environment, I think that it is more useful to conceive of global affairs taking place within the parameters of an "international society" rather than an "international community."
And we are in a transition phase. More and more, we accept the idea that sovereignty is not absolute and we may have responsibilities to people who are not citizens with us in a shared political community--but if the nation-state cannot or will not accept its sovereign responsibilities, we are still unsure as to who should and who should bear those burdens. Witness Somalia (or Sudan).
Will the deaths in Burma/Myanmar cause states--and more importantly, populations--to reassess their views? Would Americans support sending U.S. troops into humanitarian missions? Should we revisit an earlier proposal, about having contract forces (soldiers and civilian experts) on staff to do such missions?
Interested in your reactions to the program.
My fellow panelists didn't like that I've adopted the position articulated by Pang Zhongying, that there is no "international community" that exists above or separate from sovereign nation-states. To quote from his 2002 essay:
it is necessary to draw the distinction between the concepts of "international community" versus "international society." "Community" implies that its components share many things in common, such as values, whereas "society" recognizes that, while actors may have shared interests, there is no overarching common power or universal standard. Former United Nations Secretary-General Butros Butros Ghali has been a leading proponent of the notion of "the international community." I maintain that, at present, one can use the term "international community" to describe something like the European Union, a community of nation-states sharing common values, institutions, and procedures, but I do not believe that Ghali's vision applies to the reality of world politics. Thus, in assessing China's international environment, I think that it is more useful to conceive of global affairs taking place within the parameters of an "international society" rather than an "international community."
And we are in a transition phase. More and more, we accept the idea that sovereignty is not absolute and we may have responsibilities to people who are not citizens with us in a shared political community--but if the nation-state cannot or will not accept its sovereign responsibilities, we are still unsure as to who should and who should bear those burdens. Witness Somalia (or Sudan).
Will the deaths in Burma/Myanmar cause states--and more importantly, populations--to reassess their views? Would Americans support sending U.S. troops into humanitarian missions? Should we revisit an earlier proposal, about having contract forces (soldiers and civilian experts) on staff to do such missions?
Interested in your reactions to the program.
Friday World Without the West Watch
Just some items to consider.
--further attempts to institutionalize the BRIC format. The finance and economics ministers of the foursome are set to meet in Brazil, and the second summit after Yekaterinburg will be in India in 2009.
--claims coming out from that meeting that it is the U.S. (and Japan) which is blocking expansion of the G-8 to include countries like India--not a particularly good piece of public relations for Washington's ability to woo New Dehli or Brasilia. (As I had mentioned yesterday, in contrast French president Sarkozy has endorsed an expansion of the group).
--India shifted its position on Kosovo, for the first time signing on the the proposition that the unilateral declaration of independence is in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1244 and calling for new talks between Belgrade and Pristina to produce an agreement.
--Russia, India and China called for a "diplomatic settlement" of the Iranian and India reaffirmed its support for Tehran's civilian nuclear ambitions.
--In response to Senator Chuck Schumer's call for Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or face sanctions preventing Riyadh from buying U.S. arms, Saudi Arabia is reportedly looking at what Russia might have to offer.
Now the bargaining shifts back to what we might want to offer.
--further attempts to institutionalize the BRIC format. The finance and economics ministers of the foursome are set to meet in Brazil, and the second summit after Yekaterinburg will be in India in 2009.
--claims coming out from that meeting that it is the U.S. (and Japan) which is blocking expansion of the G-8 to include countries like India--not a particularly good piece of public relations for Washington's ability to woo New Dehli or Brasilia. (As I had mentioned yesterday, in contrast French president Sarkozy has endorsed an expansion of the group).
--India shifted its position on Kosovo, for the first time signing on the the proposition that the unilateral declaration of independence is in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1244 and calling for new talks between Belgrade and Pristina to produce an agreement.
--Russia, India and China called for a "diplomatic settlement" of the Iranian and India reaffirmed its support for Tehran's civilian nuclear ambitions.
--In response to Senator Chuck Schumer's call for Saudi Arabia to increase oil production or face sanctions preventing Riyadh from buying U.S. arms, Saudi Arabia is reportedly looking at what Russia might have to offer.
Now the bargaining shifts back to what we might want to offer.
Thursday, May 15, 2008
Hiding Behind the Chinese (and the Indians too) ...
The wires have the story that Cindy McCain has sold several million dollars worth of holdings in two investment funds that, within their portfolio, had investments in Chinese and Indian oil firms doing business in Sudan.
Did she carefully read the prospecti to see which companies the funds were investing in, and then track down each of those companies' operations? Of course not--and let's be honest, no one else does this too when making routine mutual fund investments. Other presidential candidates only divested themselves last year--so the McCains may be late, but it is not like others were particularly early.
But it also highlights the real dilemma. Hot money to be made these days in investing in the BRIC--so you get a good rate of return. But you also can't then control how those funds are invested.
This also points to how Beijing and New Delhi really do provide the shield by which we in the West can say, we aren't doing business in Sudan. True, we are just enabling others to do business. U.S. investors provide the funds that allow Chinese companies to develop oil reserves which can then be sold to Japan. How convenient.
TWR readers recall my post from last month on this question, where I had written:
Perhaps some of this is explained by having Chinese companies doing the producing and then selling on the open market to democratic states. Does this assuage Japanese or Korean or European or American consciences, that the products of these states were sold by Chinese middlemen, while absolving us of responsibility?
__
So, what happens now. Does American Funds drop companies that invest in Sudan from its portfolio? Will the sudden visibility cause other big investors to pull their investments? Are people willing to put principle ahead of pocketbook?
Did she carefully read the prospecti to see which companies the funds were investing in, and then track down each of those companies' operations? Of course not--and let's be honest, no one else does this too when making routine mutual fund investments. Other presidential candidates only divested themselves last year--so the McCains may be late, but it is not like others were particularly early.
But it also highlights the real dilemma. Hot money to be made these days in investing in the BRIC--so you get a good rate of return. But you also can't then control how those funds are invested.
This also points to how Beijing and New Delhi really do provide the shield by which we in the West can say, we aren't doing business in Sudan. True, we are just enabling others to do business. U.S. investors provide the funds that allow Chinese companies to develop oil reserves which can then be sold to Japan. How convenient.
TWR readers recall my post from last month on this question, where I had written:
Perhaps some of this is explained by having Chinese companies doing the producing and then selling on the open market to democratic states. Does this assuage Japanese or Korean or European or American consciences, that the products of these states were sold by Chinese middlemen, while absolving us of responsibility?
__
So, what happens now. Does American Funds drop companies that invest in Sudan from its portfolio? Will the sudden visibility cause other big investors to pull their investments? Are people willing to put principle ahead of pocketbook?
First Comments out of Yekaterinburg
One "lure" the United States has tried to deploy vis-a-vis India in the past is to support India playing a greater global role. China and Russia are just as prepared to endorse that proposition. Press Trust of India reports:
"China along with Russia today expressed support for India's "aspirations" to play a greater role in the United Nations, signalling its readiness to back New Delhi's quest for a permanent berth in the Security Council. "The Ministers of Russia and China reiterated that their countries attach importance to the status of India in international affairs and understand and support India's aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations," according to a joint communique of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, India and China (RIC) who held a meeting here.
"Russia and China also expressed their readiness to provide additional opportunities to India within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation of which it is an observer."
An interesting report from Bloomberg--`BRIC' Nations Summit Seeks to Turn Economic Might Into Clout.
French president Sarkozy, by the way, has not only NOT endorsed the call of Senator McCain to "throw" Russia out of the G-8 but has signaled his support for making China, India and Brazil full members and not just have them as "invited guests" at future summits.
By the way, I liked Sujit Dutta's comment (he is an analyst at New Delhi's Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses)--that this BRIC meeting is important because "through this informal arrangement, the four nations will understand each others' policies, discuss common factors and issues and leverage their positions through dialogue." The key word here being LEVERAGE.
"China along with Russia today expressed support for India's "aspirations" to play a greater role in the United Nations, signalling its readiness to back New Delhi's quest for a permanent berth in the Security Council. "The Ministers of Russia and China reiterated that their countries attach importance to the status of India in international affairs and understand and support India's aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations," according to a joint communique of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, India and China (RIC) who held a meeting here.
"Russia and China also expressed their readiness to provide additional opportunities to India within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation of which it is an observer."
An interesting report from Bloomberg--`BRIC' Nations Summit Seeks to Turn Economic Might Into Clout.
French president Sarkozy, by the way, has not only NOT endorsed the call of Senator McCain to "throw" Russia out of the G-8 but has signaled his support for making China, India and Brazil full members and not just have them as "invited guests" at future summits.
By the way, I liked Sujit Dutta's comment (he is an analyst at New Delhi's Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses)--that this BRIC meeting is important because "through this informal arrangement, the four nations will understand each others' policies, discuss common factors and issues and leverage their positions through dialogue." The key word here being LEVERAGE.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
More than an Image Problem in the Islamic World
Yesterday's discussion with Andrew Kohut and Richard Wike raised an interesting point: the United States is not viewed in many parts of the Islamic world (or for that matter in other regions as well) as being interested in the promotion of democracy or human rights but instead using this rhetoric to advance their own interests. As a result, things many Americans think we should get "credit" for in the Islamic world--Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.-are discounted--in other words, the U.S. didn't do these things to help Muslims but to advance U.S. interests.
I'm also trying to get my thoughts around a remarkable passage I came across in Steve LeVine's recent book The Oil and The Glory. Based on his interviews, he says that in the 1990s, U.S. diplomats in Pakistan were portraying the Taliban and its takeover of power in Afghanistan as "the will of the people." If that's the case, it would therefore not be surprising to me why Pakistanis might see our later opposition to the Taliban as not being based on concerns for democracy, but pure power politics--and why this might contribute to the trends Kohut and Wike have tracked. But this is just a thought.
I'm also trying to get my thoughts around a remarkable passage I came across in Steve LeVine's recent book The Oil and The Glory. Based on his interviews, he says that in the 1990s, U.S. diplomats in Pakistan were portraying the Taliban and its takeover of power in Afghanistan as "the will of the people." If that's the case, it would therefore not be surprising to me why Pakistanis might see our later opposition to the Taliban as not being based on concerns for democracy, but pure power politics--and why this might contribute to the trends Kohut and Wike have tracked. But this is just a thought.
BRIC Summit
The foreign ministers of Brazil, China, India and Russia will begin their quadrilateral meetings today in Yekaterinburg, Russia.
Who would have predicted ten years ago that this would happen?
What is interesting about the announced agenda is its focus on economic and commercial issues--including energy, the role of biofuels, the question of food security, and the impact of the slowdown of the U.S. economy.
My sense is that a common theme will also be complaining about the "dysfunctionality" of the U.S. role in the world--and ways in which these four countries can insulate themselves from American-inspired volatility.
All four countries are riding high these days--China has more than $1.5 trillion in foreign reserves, Russia at $500 billion, India at $300 billion, and Brazil at $200 billion. Breaking them into two classes, you have two leading manufacturing powers and two leading resource providers--so increasing synergies benefits them.
I doubt we will see much public posturing against Washington--after all, Brazil and India are cultivating much better relations with the United States--but I think there will be a high degree of receptiveness to the argument that the four should work more closely together.
Who would have predicted ten years ago that this would happen?
What is interesting about the announced agenda is its focus on economic and commercial issues--including energy, the role of biofuels, the question of food security, and the impact of the slowdown of the U.S. economy.
My sense is that a common theme will also be complaining about the "dysfunctionality" of the U.S. role in the world--and ways in which these four countries can insulate themselves from American-inspired volatility.
All four countries are riding high these days--China has more than $1.5 trillion in foreign reserves, Russia at $500 billion, India at $300 billion, and Brazil at $200 billion. Breaking them into two classes, you have two leading manufacturing powers and two leading resource providers--so increasing synergies benefits them.
I doubt we will see much public posturing against Washington--after all, Brazil and India are cultivating much better relations with the United States--but I think there will be a high degree of receptiveness to the argument that the four should work more closely together.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Where Medvedev is A-Traveling Too ...
Where the new Russian president travels--and when--is an interesting indicator of Russia's diplomatic agenda.
Medvedev has announced that his first international journey will be to Kazakhstan--which has emerged as one of Russia's closest partners in the Eurasian space--and from Kazakhstan, to then travel to Beijing. China will be the first "great power" destination.
"Medvedev is giving priority to China in Russia's foreign relations with major powers," Professor Xu Tao of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations was quoted as saying in the China Daily.
Complementing this approach to the "south and east", in a few days, the foreign ministers of China, India, Brazil and Russia will meet in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Indian Prime Minister Singh has already extended an invitation for Medvedev to visit India and plans are apparently afoot for Medvedev to travel to New Delhi later this year.
However, he won't neglect Europe, and Russia's closest partner there. Plans are underway for Medvedev to travel to Berlin in June for meetings with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel, of course, was the first foreign leader to meet with Medvedev following his election as president in March.
President Bush met Medvedev in Sochi last month and he will meet the new Russian president again in July at the G-8 summit in Tokyo. But it is quite interesting to see what capitals a new Russian president feels he needs to visit soon: Astana, Beijing, Berlin and New Delhi.
Medvedev has announced that his first international journey will be to Kazakhstan--which has emerged as one of Russia's closest partners in the Eurasian space--and from Kazakhstan, to then travel to Beijing. China will be the first "great power" destination.
"Medvedev is giving priority to China in Russia's foreign relations with major powers," Professor Xu Tao of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations was quoted as saying in the China Daily.
Complementing this approach to the "south and east", in a few days, the foreign ministers of China, India, Brazil and Russia will meet in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Indian Prime Minister Singh has already extended an invitation for Medvedev to visit India and plans are apparently afoot for Medvedev to travel to New Delhi later this year.
However, he won't neglect Europe, and Russia's closest partner there. Plans are underway for Medvedev to travel to Berlin in June for meetings with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel, of course, was the first foreign leader to meet with Medvedev following his election as president in March.
President Bush met Medvedev in Sochi last month and he will meet the new Russian president again in July at the G-8 summit in Tokyo. But it is quite interesting to see what capitals a new Russian president feels he needs to visit soon: Astana, Beijing, Berlin and New Delhi.
Monday, May 12, 2008
New Cabinet in Russia
The composition of the cabinet, as selected by prime minister designate Vladimir Putin for ratification to new president Dmitry Medvedev, is a further signal of the importance of maintaining a united consensus. It also suggests that the message to all Kremlin factions is that it is better to be part of the large tent than cast outside of it.
The cabinet, as noted, will have seven vice prime-ministers serving under Putin; starting with the two "first vice premiers"--the former prime minister Viktor Zubkov and the G-8 sherpa and former deputy chief of staff for Putin, Igor Shuvalov. Putin aide Igor Sechin will now supervise industrial policy. Sergei Ivanov remains a vice prime minister, although no longer one of the two deputies. Putin's chief of staff remains in that position, switching from the presidential administration to the prime ministerial one, while another "Petersburger", Sergei Naryshkin, moves into the position of the presidential chief of staff.
Finance Minister Kudrin retains his portfolio, along with Economic Development minister Elvira Nabiullina, while Sergei Lavrov and Anatoly Serdyukov retain the foreign ministry and the defense ministry, respectively.
Viktor Khristenko, who in the past served as energy minister, is the new minister of industry, and he will supervise a number of key agencies, among the Russian Fund for Federal Property and the Federal Agency for Industrial Development (Rosprom).
Signals so far? A strong sense of continuity--very few personnel shakeups. Second, a desire to avoid radical breaks or conflicts; many of Putin's presidential administration is migrating into the government, freeing up new appointments for Medvedev. Finally, my early read--a "balancing" effect where cabinet ministers are balanced with the deputies to the prime minister.
The cabinet, as noted, will have seven vice prime-ministers serving under Putin; starting with the two "first vice premiers"--the former prime minister Viktor Zubkov and the G-8 sherpa and former deputy chief of staff for Putin, Igor Shuvalov. Putin aide Igor Sechin will now supervise industrial policy. Sergei Ivanov remains a vice prime minister, although no longer one of the two deputies. Putin's chief of staff remains in that position, switching from the presidential administration to the prime ministerial one, while another "Petersburger", Sergei Naryshkin, moves into the position of the presidential chief of staff.
Finance Minister Kudrin retains his portfolio, along with Economic Development minister Elvira Nabiullina, while Sergei Lavrov and Anatoly Serdyukov retain the foreign ministry and the defense ministry, respectively.
Viktor Khristenko, who in the past served as energy minister, is the new minister of industry, and he will supervise a number of key agencies, among the Russian Fund for Federal Property and the Federal Agency for Industrial Development (Rosprom).
Signals so far? A strong sense of continuity--very few personnel shakeups. Second, a desire to avoid radical breaks or conflicts; many of Putin's presidential administration is migrating into the government, freeing up new appointments for Medvedev. Finally, my early read--a "balancing" effect where cabinet ministers are balanced with the deputies to the prime minister.
Not Misreading India
As readers of TWR know, I have been a strong proponent of closer U.S.-India ties. What I have tried not to do, however, is to assume that India's desire for much closer and improved relations with Washington comes at the expense of what the country will see as its fundamental national interests.
Can India be a close strategic partner of the United States? Yes. Is India on the verge of becoming the next "special relationship" in the way that the UK and Japan have such ties with the United States? At this stage, I would say no. I don't see any evidence that the Indian strategic and defense elite is going to completely overhaul the country's orientations simply to become America's "best friend" in Asia.
India instead is going to want to balance out its relationships. Take this observation, from Commodore Uday Bhaskar, about the U.S.-Iran dilemma faced by India:
India -- like China -- needs energy from any and every source to sustain its GDP growth and related developmental goals and Iran's importance cannot be ignored. The choice for India is not an 'either-or' option in relation to the US/Iran and the nuclear/oil sector. India needs both and the challenge for Indian foreign policy will be to realise both objectives.
Writing in the Asia Times, Siddarth Srivastava, an Indian journalist, concludes that the “emerging trend” in New Delhi’s approach to international affairs “is a skillful balancing of its strategic relationships with the major powers.”
I think we can work with this--but this certainly does not suggest that India is going to play the role some here in Washington would like it to play.
Can India be a close strategic partner of the United States? Yes. Is India on the verge of becoming the next "special relationship" in the way that the UK and Japan have such ties with the United States? At this stage, I would say no. I don't see any evidence that the Indian strategic and defense elite is going to completely overhaul the country's orientations simply to become America's "best friend" in Asia.
India instead is going to want to balance out its relationships. Take this observation, from Commodore Uday Bhaskar, about the U.S.-Iran dilemma faced by India:
India -- like China -- needs energy from any and every source to sustain its GDP growth and related developmental goals and Iran's importance cannot be ignored. The choice for India is not an 'either-or' option in relation to the US/Iran and the nuclear/oil sector. India needs both and the challenge for Indian foreign policy will be to realise both objectives.
Writing in the Asia Times, Siddarth Srivastava, an Indian journalist, concludes that the “emerging trend” in New Delhi’s approach to international affairs “is a skillful balancing of its strategic relationships with the major powers.”
I think we can work with this--but this certainly does not suggest that India is going to play the role some here in Washington would like it to play.
Friday, May 09, 2008
Dialogue Across the Atlantic
I am in Philadelphia attending the 8th annual Trans-Atlantic Editors' Roundtable. Just a few thoughts that have been heard around the table (and by no means exhaustive or even completely representative of the conversations):
--How do we manage a trans-Atlantic relationship when it is clear that while interests may converge in some instances, they don't in other areas? Do we choose to "agree to disagree" in the latter case, or try to find some sort of compromise solution?
--Can we even speak about the trans-Atlantic relationship as its own self-contained world, or do we have to acknowledge that other actors are present? Can we still talk about trans-Atlantic ties without reference to China and Russia?
--Is this statement still accurate in today's world--when the United States and the EU agree on an issue, this forms the basis for a global consensus; when the U.S. and the EU disagree, no such global consensus will be possible?
--What is the best way of making Russia a "responsible stakeholder" in both European and global affairs?
--Would a democratizing China be any more likely than an autocratic one to slow down its economic growth or work to limit its emissions and use of resources? Or, given the large number of poor still present, would a democratic China be even under greater pressure to speed up economic growth? (This in the context that China is building one new coal-fired power plant a week; claims it cannot afford clean coal technology for all of its power needs; and where each additional unit of GDP growth essentially requires 1 to 1.3 additional units of energy).
--Democrats claim to be more multilateral and more solicitous of European concerns, but given a renewed protectionist mood and a desire to revisit trade agreements, would the next Democratic administration clash with Europe over trade?
--Do we have a growing consensus on how to deal with climate change across the Atlantic or not? (TWR readers will recall that at last year's roundtable in London, the thesis was advanced that disagreements over climate change will be to the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship what Iraq in 2003 was--a deeply divisive event.)
Just some thoughts.
--How do we manage a trans-Atlantic relationship when it is clear that while interests may converge in some instances, they don't in other areas? Do we choose to "agree to disagree" in the latter case, or try to find some sort of compromise solution?
--Can we even speak about the trans-Atlantic relationship as its own self-contained world, or do we have to acknowledge that other actors are present? Can we still talk about trans-Atlantic ties without reference to China and Russia?
--Is this statement still accurate in today's world--when the United States and the EU agree on an issue, this forms the basis for a global consensus; when the U.S. and the EU disagree, no such global consensus will be possible?
--What is the best way of making Russia a "responsible stakeholder" in both European and global affairs?
--Would a democratizing China be any more likely than an autocratic one to slow down its economic growth or work to limit its emissions and use of resources? Or, given the large number of poor still present, would a democratic China be even under greater pressure to speed up economic growth? (This in the context that China is building one new coal-fired power plant a week; claims it cannot afford clean coal technology for all of its power needs; and where each additional unit of GDP growth essentially requires 1 to 1.3 additional units of energy).
--Democrats claim to be more multilateral and more solicitous of European concerns, but given a renewed protectionist mood and a desire to revisit trade agreements, would the next Democratic administration clash with Europe over trade?
--Do we have a growing consensus on how to deal with climate change across the Atlantic or not? (TWR readers will recall that at last year's roundtable in London, the thesis was advanced that disagreements over climate change will be to the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship what Iraq in 2003 was--a deeply divisive event.)
Just some thoughts.
